I will continue to research all fifty states and post all that have been revoked as a follow–up to this post.

Start Slide Show with PicLens Lite

The problem I’ve been having with taking this site further is how it can have any credible authority to bring charges against the criminal wrongdoings that we see happening. Now with a Democratically controlled House and Senate and few true Conservative Republicans in either House, this is our only chance to have any oversight. It also allows us to legally blind-side them and I love it.

The Federal Grand Jury is the 4th Branch of Government

[I originally posted this essay at my Citizenspook blog back in 2005.]

All of us may one day serve as grand jurors in federal court, and I hope this article will educate the reader to his/her true power as granted by the Constitution. For that power, despite having been hidden for many years behind the veil of a legislative fraud, still exists in all of its glory in the 5th Amendment to the Constitution. The US Supreme Court has confirmed and reinforced that power.

So please, copy this report and paste it far and wide. It is not spin. It is not false. It is not for sale, it is not copyrighted by me, so paste and quote it freely. This report is the truth and we need truth, now, more than ever.

The Constitutional power of “we the people” sitting as grand jurors has been subverted by a deceptive play on words since 1946 when the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure were enacted. Regardless, the power I am going to explain to you still exists in the Constitution, and has been upheld by the United States Supreme Court despite the intention of the legislature and other legal scholars to make our power disappear with a cheap magic trick.

Repeat a lie with force and repetition and the lie becomes known as truth. In the case of the 5th Amendment to the Constitution, the power of the grand jury, to return “presentments” on its own proactive initiation, without reliance upon a US Attorney to concur in such criminal charges, has been usurped by an insidious play on words.

Most of this article is going to quote other scholars, judges and legislators as I piece together a brief but thorough history of the federal grand jury for your review. But the punch line is my personal contribution to the cause:

UNITED STATES CITIZENS SITTING AS FEDERAL GRAND JURORS ARE THE FOURTH BRANCH OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT.

My input into this vital fight is no more than the analysis of a few carefully used words. It only took a small sleight of pen back in 1946 to hide our power, and it won’t take more than a few words to take that power back. But a proper overview is necessary for most of you who are unfamiliar with the issue at hand. So let me provide you with some history and then we’ll see what went wrong and how to correct it.

HISTORY OF FEDERAL GRAND JURY POWER

I want to draw your attention to a law review article, CREIGHTON LAW REVIEW, Vol. 33, No. 4 1999-2000, 821, IF IT’S NOT A RUNAWAY, IT’S NOT A REAL GRAND JURY by Roger Roots, J.D.

“In addition to its traditional role of screening criminal cases for prosecution, common law grand juries had the power to exclude prosecutors from their presence at any time and to investigate public officials without governmental influence. These fundamental powers allowed grand juries to serve a vital function of oversight upon the government. The function of a grand jury to ferret out government corruption was the primary purpose of the grand jury system in ages past.”

The 5th Amendment:

“No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury.”

An article appearing in American Juror, the newsletter of the American Jury Institute and the Fully Informed Jury Association, citing the famed American jurist, Joseph Story, explained :

“An indictment is a written accusation of an offence preferred to, and presented, upon oath, as true, by a grand jury, at the suit of the government. An indictment is framed by the officers of the government, and laid before the grand jury. Presentments, on the other hand, are the result of a jury’s independent action:

‘A presentment, properly speaking, is an accusation, made by a grand jury of its own mere motion, of an offence upon its own observation and knowledge, or upon evidence before it, and without any bill of indictment laid before it at the suit of the government. Upon a presentment, the proper officer of the court must frame an indictment, before the party accused can be put to answer it.’ “

Back to the Creighton Law Review:

“A ‘runaway’ grand jury, loosely defined as a grand jury which resists the accusatory choices of a government prosecutor, has been virtually eliminated by modern criminal procedure. Today’s “runaway” grand jury is in fact the common law grand jury of the past. Prior to the emergence of governmental prosecution as the standard model of American criminal justice, all grand juries were in fact “runaways,” according to the definition of modern times; they operated as completely independent, self-directing bodies of inquisitors, with power to pursue unlawful conduct to its very source, including the government itself.”

So, it’s clear that the Constitution intended to give the grand jury power to instigate criminal charges, and this was especially true when it came to government oversight. But something strange happened on the way to the present. That power was eroded by a lie enacted by the legislative branch. The 5th Amendment to the Constitution still contains the same words quoted above, but if you sit on a grand jury and return a “presentment” today, the prosecutor must sign it or it probably won’t be allowed to stand by the judge and the criminal charges you have brought to the court’s attention will be swept away. And the reason for this can be found in a legislative lie of epic proportions.

Mr. Roots weighs in again:

“In 1946, the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure were adopted, codifying what had previously been a vastly divergent set of common law procedural rules and regional customs.[86] In general, an effort was made to conform the rules to the contemporary state of federal criminal practice.[87] In the area of federal grand jury practice, however, a remarkable exception was allowed. The drafters of Rules 6 and 7, which loosely govern federal grand juries, denied future generations of what had been the well-recognized powers of common law grand juries: powers of unrestrained investigation and of independent declaration of findings. The committee that drafted the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure provided no outlet for any document other than a prosecutor-signed indictment. In so doing, the drafters at least tacitly, if not affirmatively, opted to ignore explicit constitutional language.“[88]“

Rule 7 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure (FRCP):

“An offense which may be punished by death shall be prosecuted by indictment. An offense which may be punished by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year or at hard labor shall be prosecuted by indictment…”

No mention of “presentments” can be found in Rule 7. But they are mentioned in Note 4 of the Advisory Committee Notes on the Rules:

“4. Presentment is not included as an additional type of formal accusation, since presentments as a method of instituting prosecutions are obsolete, at least as concerns the Federal courts.”

The American Juror published the following commentary with regards to Note 4:

“[W]hile the writers of the federal rules made provisions for indictments, they made none for presentments. This was no oversight. According to Professor Lester B. Orfield, a member of the Advisory Committee on Rules of Criminal Procedure, the drafters of Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure Rule 6 decided the term presentment should not be used, even though it appears in the Constitution. Orfield states [22 F.R.D. 343, 346]:

‘There was an annotation by the Reporter on the term presentment as used in the Fifth Amendment. It was his conclusion that the term should not be used in the new rules of criminal procedure. Retention might encourage the use of the run-away grand jury as the grand jury could act from their own knowledge or observation and not only from charges made by the United States attorney. It has become the practice for the United States Attorney to attend grand jury hearings, hence the use of presentments have been abandoned.’ “

That’s a fascinating statement: “Retention might encourage…the grand jury [to] act from their own knowledge or observation.” God forbid, right America? The nerve of these people. They have the nerve to put on the record that they intended to usurp our Constitutional power, power that was intended by the founding fathers, in their incredible wisdom, to provide us with oversight over tyrannical government.

And so they needed a spin term to cast aspersions on that power. The term they chose was, “runaway grand jury”, which is nothing more than a Constitutionally mandated grand jury, aware of their power, and legally exercising that power to hold the federal beast in check, as in “checks and balances”.

The lie couldn’t be inserted into the Constitution, so they put it in a statute and then repeated it. And scholars went on to repeat it, and today, as it stands, the grand jury has effectively been lied into the role of submissive puppet of the US Attorney.

The American Juror publication included a very relevant commentary:

“Of course, no statute or rule can alter the provisions of the Constitution, since it is the supreme law of the land. But that didn’t prevent the federal courts from publishing a body of case law affirming the fallacy that presentments were abolished. A particularly egregious example:

‘A rule that would permit anyone to communicate with a grand jury without the supervision or screening of the prosecutor or the court would compromise, if not utterly subvert, both of the historic functions of the grand jury, for it would facilitate the pursuit of vendettas and the gratification of private malice. A rule that would open the grand jury to the public without judicial or prosecutorial intervention is an invitation to anyone interested in trying to persuade a majority of the grand jury, by hook or by crook, to conduct investigations that a prosecutor has determined to be inappropriate or unavailing.’ [7]

What is the result? Investigating seditious acts of government officials can be deemed inappropriate or unavailing by the prosecutor, or the judge can dismiss the grand jurors pursuing such investigations. Consequently, corrupt government officials have few natural enemies and go about their seditious business unimpeded.

By the way, they made a rule to take care of runaways too, in 1946: Rule 6(g):

‘At any time for cause shown the court may excuse a juror either temporarily or
permanently, and in the latter event the court may impanel another person in place of the juror excused.’ Now judges can throw anyone off a grand jury, or even dis-impanel a grand jury entirely, merely for exercising its discretion.”

Now let me add my two cents to this argument:

Most of the discussion about Note 4 to Rule 7 of the FRCP takes for granted that the common law use of “presentments” (as codified in the 5th Amendment) was made “illegal” in 1946 by this act. Nothing could be more false. Note 4 does not contain language that makes the use of presentments “illegal”, although it had chosen its words carefully to make it appear as if that is what the legislative branch intended. But let’s look at Note 4 again:

“4. Presentment is not included as an additional type of formal accusation, since presentments as a method of instituting prosecutions are obsolete, at least as concerns the Federal courts.”

The key word is, “obsolete”. Obsolete means “outmoded”, or “not in use anymore”, but it does not mean “abolished” or “illegal”. And therein lies the big lie. The legislature knew it could not directly overrule the Constitution, especially with something so clearly worded as the 5th Amendment, which grants a power to the people which has a long and noble purpose in criminal jurisprudence. But the federal beast legislative branch sought more power to protect themselves from the oversight of “we the people”, and in its vampire like thirst for more governmental control, it inserted this insidious Note 4 in the hope that scholars and judges would play along with their ruse, or in the alternative, their ruse would appear to be legally viable.

Let’s look at some authoritative legal resources which discuss Note 4:

Susan Brenner, THE VOICE OF THE COMMUNITY: A CASE FOR GRAND JURY INDEPENDENCE:

“Finally, federal grand juries’ subservience to prosecutors was exacerbated when the federal system eliminated the use of presentments, which allowed a grand jury to bring charges on its own initiative. (N35) Now, federal grand jurors cannot return charges in the form of an indictment without a prosecutor’s consent. (N36) Elimination of the presentment demonstrates the historical trend towards elimination of proactive features in the grand jury system.”

Did Brenner fall for the lie or did she cleverly further it when she said, “[T]he federal system eliminated the use of presentments”? The federal system did no such thing. Note 4 said the use of presentments was “obsolete”. First of all, Note 4 is not a law in itself. It is a Note to a law, and the law as written, does not have anything to say about presentments. You see the leap Brenner has made? The Constitution provides for “presentments”, then the FRCP are enacted and the Rules therein do not mention presentments, nor due they ban presentments, and if they did, such a ban would be unconstitutional, since an administrative enactment regarding procedure can not overrule the Constitution.

Regardless, it’s irrelevant, since the FRCP does not mention “presentments”. Note 4 simply states that “presentments” allowed for in the 5th Amendment of the Constitution have become “obsolete”, or outmoded, which is not to say that they were “eliminated”. Shame on you Susan Brenner. You know damn well that the Constitution can only be changed by an official Amendment to it. Nothing can be “eliminated” from the Constitution by an administrative note.

The use of presentments had become obsolete because the grand jurors were not aware of their power. So the use of “presentments” became more and more rare, and then in 1946 the legislative branch seized upon the moment to make this power disappear by waving its magic wand over the Constitution.

Mr. Root got it wrong in the Creighton Law Review as well:

“Before the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure — which made independently-acting grand juries illegal for all practical purposes — grand juries were understood to have broad powers to operate at direct odds with both judges and prosecutors…”

The FRCP did not make it “illegal for all practical purposes”. That’s patently false. I don’t know if Mr. Root, and/or Susan Brenner, were acting as the magician’s assistant, but I can’t imagine how these educated scholars could be so incredibly ignorant of basic Constitutional law. Give me a damn break.

But if enough people repeat the lie, the lie appears to be the truth.

But we have it on good authority, the Supreme Court, that the lie has no legal effect.

Justice Powell, in United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 343 (1974), stated:

“The institution of the grand jury is deeply rooted in Anglo-American history. [n3] In England, the grand jury [p343] served for centuries both as a body of accusers sworn to discover and present for trial persons suspected of criminal wrongdoing and as a protector of citizens against arbitrary and oppressive governmental action. In this country, the Founders thought the grand jury so essential to basic liberties that they provided in the Fifth Amendment that federal prosecution for serious crimes can only be instituted by “a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury.” Cf. Costello v. United States, 350 U.S. 359, 361-362 (1956). The grand jury’s historic functions survive to this day. Its responsibilities continue to include both the determination whether there is probable cause to believe a crime has been committed and the protection of citizens against unfounded criminal prosecutions. Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 686-687 (1972).”

The Note 4 lie is smashed on the SCOTUS altar, “The grand jury’s historic functions survive to this day.” Take that Note 4!

Antonin Scalia effectively codified the unique independent power of the Fourth Branch into the hands of all citizens sitting as federal grand jurors. In discussing that power and unique independence granted to the grand jury, the United States Supreme Court, in United States v. Williams, 504 U.S. 36 at 48 (1992), Justice Scalia, delivering the opinion of the court, laid down the law of the land:

“‘[R]ooted in long centuries of Anglo-American history,” Hannah v. Larche, 363 U.S. 420, 490 (1960) (Frankfurter, J., concurring in result), the grand jury is mentioned in the Bill of Rights, but not in the body of the Constitution. It has not been textually assigned, therefore, to any of the branches described in the first three Articles. It “`is a constitutional fixture in its own right.’” United States v. Chanen, 549 F.2d 1306, 1312 (CA9 1977) (quoting Nixon v. Sirica, 159 U.S. App. D.C. 58, 70, n. 54, 487 F.2d 700, 712, n. 54 (1973)), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 825 (1977). ‘ “

I submit to you that this passage sets the stage for a revolutionary knew context necessary and Constitutionally mandated to “we the people”, THE FOURTH BRANCH of the Government of the United States. Besides, the Legislative, Executive, and Judicial branches, I submit that there is a fourth branch, THE GRAND JURY, and “we the people” when sitting as grand jurors, are, as Scalia quoted in US v. Williams, ” a constitutional fixture in its own right”. Yes, damn it. That is exactly what the grand jury is, and what it was always intended to be.

Scalia also stated, that “the grand jury is an institution separate from the courts, over whose functioning the courts do not preside…” Id.

And finally, to seal the deal, Scalia hammered the point home:

“In fact, the whole theory of its function is that it belongs to no branch of the institutional Government, serving as a kind of buffer or referee between the Government and the people. See Stirone v. United States, 361 U.S. 212, 218 (1960); Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43, 61 (1906); G. Edwards, The Grand Jury 28-32 (1906). Although the grand jury normally operates, of course, in the courthouse and under judicial auspices, its institutional relationship with the Judicial Branch has traditionally been, so to speak, at arm’s length. Judges’ direct involvement in the functioning of the grand jury has generally been confined to the constitutive one of calling the grand jurors together and administering their oaths of office. See United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 343 (1974); Fed.Rule Crim.Proc. 6(a). [504 U.S. 36, 48] “

This miraculous quote says it all, “…the whole theory of its function is that it belongs to no branch of the institutional Government, serving as a kind of buffer or referee between the Government and the people.” The Constitution of the United States, as interpreted by the Supreme Court, gives rise to a FOURTH BRANCH of Government, THE GRAND JURY. We the people have been charged with oversight of the government in our roles as grand jurors.

And at this critical time in American history, we must, for the protection of our constitutional republic, take back our power and start acting as powerful as the other branches of government.

The law is on our side. So please spread this knowledge as far and wide as you can. We the people have the right and power under the 5th Amendment of the Constitution to charge this government with crimes by returning presentments regardless of whether the US Attorneys or the federal judges agree with us. As the Supreme Court has so brilliantly stated, we are the “buffer between the Government and the people.”

Take the reins America. Pass it on. The Fourth Branch is alive and kickin’.

I have been following the Obama birth certificate issue for months. I was concerned enough about it to go and re-read the Constitution, twice. I was perplexed by the fact that, while Article IV, Section II clearly states that to attain the Office of the President of the United States, one must be a “natural born” citizen. The Constitution does not define the term “natural born” so I’ve been searching for a definition, case law or somewhere that the term has been enforced. Finally, I found the below article at The Federalist Blog. It is the best case I have seen made for the reason that the founding fathers and the framers of the Constitution used the term “natural born”. Now, there are lot of comments at The Federalist Blog site that either support or discredit P.A. Madison’s definition but they are largely partisan opinionated. Just as I have my opinion, common sense tells me that the framers were trying to avoid duel allegiances while at the same time allowing the states to make specific law regarding citizenship.

Following the Madison definition of “Natural Born Citizen” I have included an article by Dr. Edwin Vieira, Jr., Ph.D., J.D. Dr. Vieira’s article was written in October, before the election but builds the case for the impending Constitutional crisis that will be afoot if Barack Obama usurps the Presidency.

Friday, The Supreme Court will meet to discuss the Leo Donofrio v. Wells case. Unfortunately, they will not also be looking into the issue of “standing” that the judge used to reject the Berg vs. Obama case in Philadelphia. Dr. Vieira states… “The judge in Berg v. Obama dismissed the case, not because Obama has actually proven that he is eligible for “the Office of President,” but instead because, simply as a voter, Berg supposedly lacks “standing” to challenge Obama’s eligibility:

regardless of questions of causation, the grievance remains too generalized to establish the existence of an injury in fact. * ** [A] candidate’s ineligibility under the Natural Born Citizen Clause does not result in an injury in fact to voters. By extension, the theoretical constitutional harm experienced by voters does not change as the candidacy of an allegedly ineligible candidate progresses from the primaries to the general election.

This pronouncement does not rise to the level of hogwash.”

Defining Natural-Born Citizen

By P.A. Madison

“The common law of England is not the common law of these States.” —George Mason

UPDATED 11/28/08

What might the phrase “natural-born citizen” of the United States imply under the U.S. Constitution? The phrase has always been obscure due to the lack of any single authoritative source to confer in order to understand the condition of citizenship the phrase recognizes. Learning what the phrase might have meant following the Declaration of Independence, and following the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment, requires detective work. As with all detective work, eliminating the usual suspects from the beginning goes a long way in quickly solving a case.

What Natural-Born Citizen Could Not Mean

Could a natural-born citizen simply mean citizenship due to place of birth?

Unlikely because we know one can be native born and yet not a native born citizen of this country prior to the year 1866. There were even disputes whether anyone born within the District of Columbia or in the territories were born citizens of the United States (they were referred to as “inhabitants” instead.) National Government could make no “territorial allegiance” demands within the several States because as Madison explained it, the “powers reserved to the several States will extend to all the objects which, in the ordinary course of affairs, concern the lives, liberties, and properties of the people, and the internal order, improvement, and prosperity of the State.”

Jurisdiction over citizenship via birth within the several States was part of the “ordinary course of affairs” of the States that only local laws could affect. Early acts of Naturalization recognized the individual State Legislatures as the only authority who could make anyone a citizen of a State. Citizens of each State were united together through Article IV, Sec. II of the U.S. Constitution, and thus, no act of Congress was required to make citizens of the individual States citizens of the United States.

Prior to the Revolutionary War place of birth within the dominions of the crown was the principle criterion for establishing perpetual allegiance to the crown in this country. After independence, this maxim was only recognized as far as individual States were willing to recognize it. The State of Virginia in 1777 moved to recognize parentage (citizenship of father) in determining allegiance and citizenship. States that were slow in enacting laws controlling birth and citizenship forced the courts to adjudicate citizenship disputes under common law rules.

Congress was vested only with the power to make uniform rules of naturalization in order to remove alienage from those who were already born abroad (outside of the States) who had immigrated to any one of the individual States. The best Congress could do is declare children born to fathers who were already a citizen of some State to be a citizen themselves. In other words, naturalization only provides for the removal of alienage and not for the creation of citizens within individual States.

Additionally, if the framers merely intended for birth alone on U.S. soil then all would had been necessary was to say the President shall be “native born.”

Could a natural-born citizen perhaps be synonymous with the British term “natural-born subject”?

It is very doubtful the framers adopted the doctrine found under the old English doctrine of “natural-born subject.” The British doctrine allowed for double allegiances, something the founders considered improper.

Framer Rufus King said allegiance to the United States depended on whether a person is a “member of the body politic.” King says no nation should adopt or naturalize a person of another society without the consent of that person. The reason? Because “he ought not silently to be embarrassed with a double allegiance.”

The powers of the general government were limited and defined, preventing Congress from exercising the same kind of sovereignty that Britain had over its claimed dominions within established States of the Union.

Under the old English common law doctrine of natural-born subject, birth itself was an act of naturalization that required no prior consent or demanded allegiance to the nation in advance. Furthermore, birth was viewed as enjoining a “perpetual allegiance” upon all that could never be severed or altered by any change of time or act of anyone. England’s “perpetual allegiance” due from birth was extremely unpopular in this country; often referred to as absurd barbarism, or simply perpetual nonsense. America went to war with England over the doctrine behind “natural-born subject” in June of 1812.

Because Britain considered all who were born within the dominions of the crown to be its natural-born subjects even after becoming naturalized citizens of the United States, led to British vessels blockading American ports. Under the British blockade, every American ship entering or leaving was boarded by soldiers in search of British born subjects. At least 6,000 American citizens who were found to be British natural-born subjects were impressed into military service on behalf of the British Empire, and thus, the reason we went to war.

Fourteenth Amendment

The adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment obviously affects how we view natural-born citizens because for the first time there is a national rule of who may by birth be a citizen of the United States. Who may be born citizens of the States is conditional upon being born “subject to the jurisdiction” of the United States. The legislative definition of “subject to the jurisdiction thereof” was defined as “Not owing allegiance to anybody else.”

This national rule prevents us from interpreting natural-born citizen under common law rules because it eliminates the possibility of a child being born with more than one allegiance.

The primary author of the citizenship clause, Sen. Jacob M. Howard, said the “word jurisdiction, as here employed, ought to be construed so as to imply a full and complete jurisdiction on the part of the United States, whether exercised by Congress, by the executive, or by the judicial department; that is to say, the same jurisdiction in extent and quality as applies to every citizen of the United States now.”

United States Attorney General, George Williams, whom was a U.S. Senator aligned with Radical Republicans during the drafting of the Fourteenth Amendment in 1866, ruled in 1873 the word “jurisdiction” under the Fourteenth Amendment “must be understood to mean absolute and complete jurisdiction, such as the United States had over its citizens before the adoption of this amendment.” He added, “Political and military rights and duties” do not pertain to anyone else.

Essentially then, “subject to the jurisdiction thereof” means the same jurisdiction the United States exercises over its own citizens, i.e., only citizens of the United States come within its operation since citizens of the United States do not owe allegiance to some other nation at the same time they do the United States. This makes a great deal of sense for the time because there was a great deal of controversy over conflicts arising from double allegiances. In fact, Congress issued a joint congressional report on June 22, 1874 that said the “United States have not recognized a double allegiance.”

Fourteenth Amendment framer, Rep. John A. Bingham, argued before the House in 1871 that Dr. John Emilio Houard was a natural-born citizen of the United States. According to Bingham he was a natural-born citizen because he was “born of naturalized parents within the jurisdiction of the United States” by the “express words of the Constitution, as amended today.” A naturalized male (women became naturalized through their husbands) were required to “absolutely and entirely renounce and abjure all allegiance and fidelity” to other nations, and thus, could no longer be said to owe allegiance to anyone but the United States.

Because “subject to the jurisdiction thereof” requires not owing allegiance to any other nation, and because the nation does not recognize double allegiances that can be created at common law, narrows the possibilities to what “natural-born citizen” can mean.

Natural-Born Citizen Defined

One universal point most all early publicists agreed on was natural-born citizen must mean one who is a citizen by no act of law. If a person owes their citizenship to some act of law (naturalization for example), they cannot be considered a natural-born citizen. This leads us to defining natural-born citizen under the laws of nature – laws the founders recognized and embraced.

Under the laws of nature, every child born requires no act of law to establish the fact the child inherits through nature his/her father’s citizenship as well as his name (or even his property) through birth. This law of nature is also recognized by law of nations. Sen. Howard said the citizenship clause under the Fourteenth Amendment was by virtue of “natural law and national law.” The first Naturalization Act passed by Congress recognized “natural-born citizens” to be those born beyond the States to resident fathers who were already established citizens of the United States.

The advantages of Natural Law is competing allegiances between nations are avoided, or at least with those nations whose custom is to not make citizens of other countries citizens without their consent. Additional alternations or conflicts due to a child’s natural citizenship are strictly a creature of local municipal law. In the year 1866, the United States for the first time adopted a local municipal law under Sec. 1992 of U.S. Revised Statutes that read: “All persons born in the United States and not subject to any foreign power, excluding Indians not taxed, are declared to be citizens of the United States.”

Rep. Bingham commenting on Section 1992 said it means “every human being born within the jurisdiction of the United States of parents not owing allegiance to any foreign sovereignty is, in the language of your Constitution itself, a natural born citizen.” This national law does not endow upon any person allegiance through birth alone as was the custom under the old English common law practice but only recognizes citizenship of those born to parents who do not owe allegiance to another nation. In other words, national law prevented the creation of conflicting dual citizenships between other nation’s citizens.

Secretary of State Bayard ruled under Section 1992 of U.S. Revised Statutes in 1885 that although Richard Greisser was born in the United States, his father at the time of his birth was a subject of Germany, and thus, Richard Greisser could not be a citizen of the United States. Furthermore, it was held his father was not subject to the jurisdiction of the United States under the Fourteenth Amendment.

The constitutional requirement for the President of the United States to be a natural-born citizen had one purpose according to St. George Tucker:

That provision in the constitution which requires that the president shall be a native-born citizen (unless he were a citizen of the United States when the constitution was adopted,) is a happy means of security against foreign influence, which, wherever it is capable of being exerted, is to he dreaded more than the plague. The admission of foreigners into our councils, consequently, cannot be too much guarded against; their total exclusion from a station to which foreign nations have been accustomed to, attach ideas of sovereign power, sacredness of character, and hereditary right, is a measure of the most consummate policy and wisdom. … The title of king, prince, emperor, or czar, without the smallest addition to his powers, would have rendered him a member of the fraternity of crowned heads: their common cause has more than once threatened the desolation of Europe. To have added a member to this sacred family in America, would have invited and perpetuated among us all the evils of Pandora’s Box.

Additionally, Charles Pinckney in 1800 said the presidential eligibility clause was designed “to insure … attachment to the country.”

What better way to insure attachment to the country then to require the President to have inherited his American citizenship through his American father and not through a foreign father. Any child can be born anywhere in the country and removed by their father to be raised in his native country. The risks would be for the child the return in later life to reside in this country bringing with him foreign influences and intrigues.

Therefore, we can say with confidence that a natural-born citizen of the United States means those persons born whose father the United States already has an established jurisdiction over, i.e., born to father’s who are themselves citizens of the United States. A person who had been born under a double allegiance cannot be said to be a natural-born citizen of the United States because such status is not recognized (only in fiction of law). A child born to an American mother and alien father could be said to be a citizen of the United States by some affirmative act of law but never entitled to be a natural-born citizen because through laws of nature the child inherits the condition of their father.

Related:

What “Subject to the Jurisdiction Thereof” Really Means

Wong Kim Ark Analysis

OBAMA MUST STAND UP NOW OR STEP DOWN

By Dr. Edwin Vieira, Jr., Ph.D., J.D.

October 29, 2008
NewsWithViews.com

America is facing potentially the gravest constitutional crisis in her history. Barack Obama must either stand up in a public forum and prove, with conclusive documentary evidence, that he is “a natural born Citizen” of the United States who has not renounced his America citizenship—or he must step down as the Democratic Party’s candidate for President of the United States—preferably before the election is held, and in any event before the Electoral College meets. Because, pursuant to the Constitution, only “a natural born Citizen, or a Citizen of the United States at the time of the Adoption of th[e] Constitution, shall be eligible to the Office of President” (Article II, Section 1, Clause 4). And Obama clearly was not “a Citizen of the United States at the time of the Adoption of th[e] Constitution.”

Whether the evidence will show that Obama is, or is not, “a natural born Citizen” who has never renounced his American citizenship is an open question. The arguments on both sides are as yet speculative. But Obama’s stubborn refusal to provide what he claims is “his own” country with conclusive proof on that score compels the presumption that he knows, or at least strongly suspects, that no sufficient evidence in his favor exists. After all, he is not being pressed to solve a problem in quantum physics that is “above his pay grade,” but only asked to provide the public with the original copy of some official record that establishes his citizenship. The vast majority of Americans could easily do so. Why will Obama not dispel the doubts about his eligibility—unless he can not?

Now that Obama’s citizenship has been seriously questioned, the burden of proof rests squarely on his shoulders. The “burden of establishing a delegation of power to the United States * * * is upon those making the claim.” Bute v. Illinois, 333 U.S. 640, 653 (1948). And if each of the General Government’s powers must be proven (not simply presumed) to exist, then every requirement that the Constitution sets for any individual’s exercise of those powers must also be proven (not simply presumed) to be fully satisfied before that individual may exercise any of those powers. The Constitution’s command that “[n]o Person except a natural born Citizen * * * shall be eligible to the Office of President” is an absolute prohibition against the exercise of each and every Presidential power by certain unqualified individuals. Actually (not simply presumptively or speculatively) being “a natural born Citizen” is the condition precedent sine qua non for avoiding this prohibition. Therefore, anyone who claims eligibility for “the Office of President” must, when credibly challenged, establish his qualifications in this regard with sufficient evidence.

In disposing of the lawsuit Berg v. Obama, which squarely presents the question of Obama’s true citizenship, the presiding judge complained that Berg “would have us derail the democratic process by invalidating a candidate for whom millions of people voted and who underwent excessive vetting during what was one of the most hotly contested presidential primary in living memory.” This is exceptionally thin hogwash. A proper judicial inquiry into Obama’s eligibility for “the Office of President” will not deny his supporters a “right” to vote for him—rather, it will determine whether they have any such “right” at all. For, just as Obama’s “right” to stand for election to “the Office of President” is contingent upon his being “a natural born Citizen,” so too are the “rights” of his partisans to vote for him contingent upon whether he is even eligible for that “Office.” If Obama is ineligible, then no one can claim any “right” to vote for him. Indeed, in that case every American who does vote has a constitutional duty to vote against him.

The judge in Berg v. Obama dismissed the case, not because Obama has actually proven that he is eligible for “the Office of President,” but instead because, simply as a voter, Berg supposedly lacks “standing” to challenge Obama’s eligibility:

regardless of questions of causation, the grievance remains too generalized to establish the existence of an injury in fact. * ** [A] candidate’s ineligibility under the Natural Born Citizen Clause does not result in an injury in fact to voters. By extension, the theoretical constitutional harm experienced by voters does not change as the candidacy of an allegedly ineligible candidate progresses from the primaries to the general election.

This pronouncement does not rise to the level of hogwash.

First, the Constitution mandates that “[t]he judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under this Constitution” (Article III, Section 2, Clause 1). Berg’s suit plainly “aris[es] under th[e] Constitution,” in the sense of raising a critical constitutional issue. So the only question is whether his suit is a constitutional “Case[ ].” The present judicial test for whether a litigant’s claim constitutes a constitutional “Case[ ]” comes under the rubric of “standing”—a litigant with “standing” may proceed; one without “standing” may not. “Standing,” however, is not a term found anywhere in the Constitution. Neither are the specifics of the doctrine of “standing,” as they have been elaborated in judicial decision after judicial decision, to be found there. Rather, the test for “standing” is almost entirely a judicial invention.

True enough, the test for “standing” is not as ridiculous as the judiciary’s so-called “compelling governmental interest test,” which licenses public officials to abridge individuals’ constitutional rights and thereby exercise powers the Constitution withholds from those officials, which has no basis whatsoever in the Constitution, and which is actually anti-constitutional. Neither is the doctrine of “standing” as abusive as the “immunities” judges have cut from whole cloth for public officials who violate their constitutional “Oath[s] or Affirmation[s], to support this constitution” (Article VI, Clause 3)—in the face of the Constitution’s explicit limitation on official immunities (Article I, Section 6, Clause 1). For the Constitution does require that a litigant must present a true “Case[ ].” Yet, because the test for “standing” s largely a contrivance of all-too-fallible men and women, its specifics can be changed as easily as they were adopted, when they are found to be faulty. And they must be changed if the consequences of judicial ignorance, inertia, and inaction are not to endanger America’s constitutional form of government. Which is precisely the situation here, inasmuch as the purported “election” of Obama as President, notwithstanding his ineligibility for that office, not only will render illegitimate the Executive Branch of the General Government, but also will render impotent its Legislative Branch (as explained below).

Second, the notion upon which the judge in Berg v. Obama fastened—namely, that Berg’s “grievance remains too generalized to establish the existence of an injury in fact,” i.e., if everyone is injured or potentially injured then no one has “standing”—is absurd on its face.

To be sure, no one has yet voted for Obama in the general election. But does that mean that no one in any group smaller than the general pool of America’s voters in its entirety has suffered specific harm from Obama’s participation in the electoral process to date? Or will suffer such harm from his continuing participation? What about the Democrats who voted for Hillary Clinton as their party’s nominee, but were saddled with Obama because other Democrats voted for him even though they could not legally have done so if his lack of eligibility for “the Office of President” had been judicially determined before the Democratic primaries or convention? What about the States that have registered Obama as a legitimate candidate for President, but will have been deceived, perhaps even defrauded, if he is proven not to be “a natural born Citizen”? And as far as the general election is concerned, what about the voters among erstwhile Republicans and Independents who do not want John McCain as President, and therefore will vote for Obama (or any Democrat, for that matter) as “the lesser of two evils,” but who later on may have their votes effectively thrown out, and may have to suffer McCain’s being declared the winner of the election, if Obama’s ineligibility is established? Or what about those voters who made monetary contributions to Obama’s campaign, but may at length discover that their funds went, not only to an ineligible candidate, but to one who knew he was ineligible?

These obvious harms pale into insignificance, however, compared to the national disaster of having an outright usurper purportedly “elected” as “President.” In this situation, it is downright idiocy to claim, as did the judge in Berg v. Obama, that a “generalized” injury somehow constitutes no judicially cognizable injury at all. Self-evidently, to claim that a “generalized” grievance negates “the existence of an injury in fact” is patently illogical—for if everyone in any group can complain of the same harm of which any one of them can complain, then the existence of some harm cannot be denied; and the more people who can complain of that harm, the greater the aggregate or cumulative seriousness of the injury. The whole may not be greater than the sum of its parts; but it is at least equal to that sum! Moreover, for a judge to rule that no injury redressable in a court of law exists, precisely because everyone in America will be subjected to an individual posing as “the President” but who constitutionally cannot be (and therefore is not) the President, sets America on the course of judicially assisted political suicide. If Obama turns out to be nothing more than an usurper who has fraudulently seized control of the Presidency, not only will the Constitution have been egregiously flouted, but also this whole country could be, likely will be, destroyed as a consequence. And if this country is even credibly threatened with destruction, every American will be harmed—irretrievably, should the threat become actuality—including those who voted or intend to vote for Obama, who are also part of We the People. Therefore, in this situation, any and every American must have “standing” to demand—and must demand, both in judicial fora and in the fora of public opinion—that Obama immediately and conclusively prove himself eligible for “the Office of President.”

Utterly imbecilic as an alternative is the judge’s prescription in Berg v. Obama that,

[i]f, through the political process, Congress determines that citizens, voters, or party members should police the Constitution’s eligibility requirements for the Presidency, then it is free to pass laws conferring standing on individuals like [Berg]. Until that time, voters do not have standing to bring the sort of challenge that [Berg] attempts to bring * * * .

Recall that this selfsame judge held that Berg has no constitutional “Case[ ]” because he has no “standing,” and that he has no “standing” because he has no “injury in fact,” only a “generalized” “grievance.” This purports to be a finding of constitutional law: namely, that constitutionally no “Case[ ]” exists. How, then, can Congress constitutionally grant “standing” to individuals such as Berg, when the courts (assuming the Berg decision is upheld on appeal) have ruled that those individuals have no “standing”? If “standing” is a constitutional conception, and the courts deny that “standing” exists in a situation such as this, and the courts have the final say as to what the Constitution means—then Congress lacks any power to contradict them. Congress cannot instruct the courts to exercise jurisdiction beyond what the Constitution includes within “the judicial Power.” Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 173-180 (1803).

In fact, though, a Congressional instruction is entirely unnecessary. Every American has what lawyers call “an implied cause of action”—directly under Article II, Section 1, Clause 4 of the Constitution—to require that anyone standing for “the Office of President” must verify his eligibility for that position, at least when serious allegations have been put forward that he is not eligible, and he has otherwise refused to refute those allegations with evidence that should be readily available if he is eligible. That “Case[ ]” is one the Constitution itself defines. And the Constitution must be enforceable in such a “Case[ ]” in a timely manner, by anyone who cares to seek enforcement, because of the horrendous consequences that will ensue if it is flouted.

What are some of those consequences?

First, if Obama is not “a natural born Citizen” or has renounced such citizenship, he is simply not eligible for “the Office of President” (Article II, Section 1, Clause 4). That being so, he cannot be “elected” by the voters, by the Electoral College, or by the House of Representatives (see Amendment XII). For neither the voters, nor the Electors, nor Members of the House can change the constitutional requirement, even by unanimous vote inter sese (see Article V). If, nonetheless, the voters, the Electors, or the Members of the House purport to “elect” Obama, he will be nothing but an usurper, because the Constitution defines him as such. And he can never become anything else, because an usurper cannot gain legitimacy if even all of the country aid, abets, accedes to, or acquiesces in his usurpation.

Second, if Obama dares to take the Presidential “Oath or Affirmation” of office, knowing that he is not “a natural born Citizen,” he will commit the crime of perjury or false swearing (see Article II, Section 1, Clause 7). For, being ineligible for “the Office of President, he cannot “faithfully execute the Office of President of the United States,” or even execute it at all, to any degree. Thus, his very act of taking the “Oath or Affirmation” will be a violation thereof! So, even if the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court himself looks the other way and administers the “Oath or Affirmation,” Obama will derive no authority whatsoever from it.

Third, his purported “Oath or Affirmation” being perjured from the beginning, Obama’s every subsequent act in the usurped “Office of President” will be a criminal offense under Title 18, United States Code, Section 242, which provides that:

[w]hoever, under color of any law, statute, ordinance, regulation, or custom, willfully subjects any person in any State, Territory, Commonwealth, Possession, or District to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured or protected by the Constitution or laws of the United States * * * shall be fined * * * or imprisoned not more than one year, or both; and if bodily injury results from the acts committed in violation of this section or if such acts include the use, attempted use, or threatened use of a dangerous weapon, explosives, or fire, shall be fined * * * or imprisoned not more than ten years, or both; and if death results from the acts committed in violation of this section or if such acts include kidnapping or an attempt to kidnap, * * *, or an attempt to kill, shall be fined * * * or imprisoned for any term of years or for life, or both, or may be sentenced to death.

Plainly enough, every supposedly “official” act performed by an usurper in the President’s chair will be an act “under color of law” that necessarily and unavoidably “subjects [some] person * * * to the deprivation of [some] rights, privileges, or immunities secured or protected by the Constitution * * * of the United States”—in the most general case, of the constitutional “right[ ]” to an eligible and duly elected individual serving as President, and the corresponding constitutional “immunit[y]” from subjection to an usurper pretending to be “the President.”

Fourth, if he turns out to be nothing but an usurper acting in the guise of “the President,” Obama will not constitutionally be the “Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy of the United States, and of the Militia of the several States, when called into the actual Service of the United States” (see Article II, Section 2, Clause 1). Therefore, he will be entitled to no obedience whatsoever from anyone in those forces. Indeed, for officers or men to follow any of his purported “orders” will constitute a serious breach of military discipline—and in extreme circumstances perhaps even “war crimes.” In addition, no one in any civilian agency in the Executive Branch of the General Government will be required to put into effect any of Obama’s purported “proclamations,” “executive orders,” or “directives.”

Fifth, as nothing but an usurper (if he becomes one), Obama will have no conceivable authority “to make Treaties”, or to “nominate, and * * * appoint Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls, Judges of the Supreme Court, and all other Officers of the United States, whose Appointments are not * * * otherwise provided for [in the Constitution]” (Article II, Section 2, Clause 2). And therefore any “Treaties” or “nominat[ions], and * * * appoint[ments]” he purports to “make” will be void ab initio, no matter what the Senate does, because the Senate can neither authorize an usurper to take such actions in the first place, nor thereafter ratify them. One need not be a lawyer to foresee what further, perhaps irremediable, chaos must ensue if an usurper, even with “the Advice and Consent of the Senate”, unconstitutionally “appoint[s] * * * Judges of the Supreme Court” whose votes thereafter make up the majorities that wrongly decide critical “Cases” of constitutional law.

Sixth, and perhaps most importantly, Congress can pass no law while an usurper pretends to occupy “the Office of President.” The Constitution provides that “[e]very Bill which shall have passed the House of Representatives and the Senate, shall, before it become a Law, be presented to the President of the United States” (Article I, Section 7, Clause 2). Not to an usurper posturing as “the President of the United States,” but to the true and rightful President. If no such true and rightful President occupies the White House, no “Bill” will or can, “before it become a Law, be presented to [him].” If no “Bill” is so presented, no “Bill” will or can become a “Law.” And any purported “Law” that the usurper “approve[s]” and “sign[s],” or that Congress passes over the usurper’s “Objections,”will be a nullity. Thus, if Obama deceitfully “enters office” as an usurper, Congress will be rendered effectively impotent for as long as it acquiesces in his pretenses as “President.”

Seventh, if Obama does become an usurper posturing as “the President,” Congress cannot even impeach him because, not being the actual President, he cannot be “removed from Office on Impeachment for, and Conviction of, Treason, Bribery, or other high Crimes and Misdemeanors” (see Article II, Section 4). In that case, some other public officials would have to arrest him—with physical force, if he would not go along quietly—in order to prevent him from continuing his imposture. Obviously, this could possibly lead to armed conflicts within the General Government itself, or among the States and the people.

Eighth, even did something approaching civil war not eventuate from Obama’s hypothetical usurpation, if the Establishment allowed Obama to pretend to be “the President,” and the people acquiesced in that charade, just about everything that was done during his faux “tenure in office” by anyone connected with the Executive Branch of the General Government, and quite a bit done by the Legislative Branch and perhaps the Judicial Branch as well, would be arguably illegitimate and subject to being overturned when a constitutional President was finally installed in office. The potential for chaos, both domestically and internationally, arising out of this systemic uncertainty is breathtaking.

The underlying problem will not be obviated if Obama, his partisans in the Democratic Party, and his cheerleaders and cover-up artists in the big media simply stonewall the issue of his (non)citizenship and contrive for him to win the Presidential election. The cat is already out of the bag and running all over the Internet. If he continues to dodge the issue, Obama will be dogged with this question every day of his purported “Presidency.” And inevitably the truth will out. For the issue is too simple, the evidence (or lack of it) too accessible. Either Obama can prove that he is “a natural born Citizen” who has not renounced his citizenship; or he cannot. And he will not be allowed to slip through with some doctored “birth certificate” generated long after the alleged fact. On a matter this important, Americans will demand that, before its authenticity is accepted, any supposed documentary evidence of that sort be subjected to reproducible forensic analyses conducted by reputable, independent investigators and laboratories above any suspicion of being influenced by or colluding with any public official, bureaucracy, political party, or other special-interest organization whatsoever.

Berg v. Obama may very well end up in the Supreme Court. Yet that ought to be unnecessary. For Obama’s moral duty is to produce the evidence of his citizenship sua sponte et instanter. Otherwise, he will be personally responsible for all the consequences of his refusal to do so.

Of course, if Obama knows that he is not “a natural born Citizen” who never renounced his American citizenship, then he also knows that he and his henchmen have perpetrated numerous election-related frauds throughout the country—the latest, still-ongoing one a colossal swindle targeting the American people as a whole. If that is the case, his refusal “to be a witness against himself” is perfectly explicable and even defensible on the grounds of the Fifth Amendment. Howsoever justified as a matter of criminal law, though, Obama’s silence and inaction will not obviate the necessity for him to prove his eligibility for “the Office of President.” The Constitution may permit him to “take the Fifth;” but it will not suffer him to employ that evasion as a means to usurp the Presidency of the United States.

© 2008 Edwin Vieira, Jr. – All Rights Reserved

Edwin Vieira, Jr., holds four degrees from Harvard: A.B. (Harvard College), A.M. and Ph.D. (Harvard Graduate School of Arts and Sciences), and J.D. (Harvard Law School).

For more than thirty years he has practiced law, with emphasis on constitutional issues. In the Supreme Court of the United States he successfully argued or briefed the cases leading to the landmark decisions Abood v. Detroit Board of Education, Chicago Teachers Union v. Hudson, and Communications Workers of America v. Beck, which established constitutional and statutory limitations on the uses to which labor unions, in both the private and the public sectors, may apply fees extracted from nonunion workers as a condition of their employment.

He has written numerous monographs and articles in scholarly journals, and lectured throughout the county. His most recent work on money and banking is the two-volume Pieces of Eight: The Monetary Powers and Disabilities of the United States Constitution (2002), the most comprehensive study in existence of American monetary law and history viewed from a constitutional perspective. www.piecesofeight.us

He is also the co-author (under a nom de plume) of the political novel CRA$HMAKER: A Federal Affaire (2000), a not-so-fictional story of an engineered crash of the Federal Reserve System, and the political upheaval it causes. www.crashmaker.com

His latest book is: “How To Dethrone the Imperial Judiciary“ … and Constitutional “Homeland Security,” Volume One, The Nation in Arms…

He can be reached at:
13877 Napa Drive
Manassas, Virginia 20112.

Start Slide Show with PicLens Lite

Monday, November 10, 2008

At Crucial Time, GOP Leadership Prepares to Fail America Again

Posted by Jeff Schreiber

Start Slide Show with PicLens Lite

As corruption lingers around every prism in today’s political spectrum, we must resort to the records. There is a particular bill which has reared it’s history to Impeach Congress. I am referring to Senate Bill 1007, 95th General Assembly. The last action of this bill was Rule 19(a) / Re-referred to Rules Committee, 5/31/2008.

A massive misrepresentation of the actual bill

Lets take a look at who is championing and advocating this fine piece of communist junk.

Senate Sponsors
Sen. Dan Kotowski – Emil Jones Jr. – John J. Millner – Jacqueline Y. Collins – Mattie Hunter, Carol Ronen, Martin A. Sandoval, Kwame Raoul, Donne E. Trotter, James T. Meeks, Jeffrey M. Schoenberg, Antonio Munoz, Kimberly A. Lightford and Heather Steans

House Sponsors
(Rep. Harry Osterman - Ed Sullivan Jr. – Carolyn H. Krause – Karen A. Yarbrough – Fred Crespo, Elizabeth Hernandez, Edward J. Acevedo, Cynthia Soto, Monique D. Davis, Elizabeth Coulson, Kenneth Dunkin, William Davis, Barbara Flynn Currie, Luis Arroyo and Greg Harris)

As for replublican representation, there is only 1. Senator John J Miller, 28th District. HOWEVER, a little digging, and he is nothing more then a mis-registered democrat. 

But wait, it gets even scarier. Assault Weapons Ban Act of 2007 (SB0016 Antonio Munoz & Dan Kotowski), 50 Caliber Rifles (SB1471 Dan Kotowski, could pass next year).

Indicators of what Democratic Leadership will be doing in the near future? Lets look at another bill that does nothing but harm our citizens: Bail Bond Deposits

Synopsis As Introduced by Antonio Munoz

Amends the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963. Provides that when the conditions of the bail bond have been performed and the accused has been discharged from all obligations in the cause, the clerk of the court shall return to the accused or to the defendant’s designee, 80% (rather than 90%) of the sum which had been deposited and shall retain as bail bond costs 10% of the amount deposited. Provides that the county sheriff shall retain the remaining 10% of the amount deposited for sheriff’s office operations. Provides that in no event shall the amount retained by the sheriff as sheriff’s office operations be less than $5. Effective immediately.

Senate Floor Amendment No. 1
Provides that the 10% of the bail bond retained by the county sheriff shall be only for bail bond deposits not exceeding $30,000.

House Amendment No. 1
Replaces everything after the enacting clause. Reinserts the provisions of the bill. Provides that of the remaining 10% of the amount deposited for bail bonds, the Circuit Court Clerk shall retain $1 to be deposited into the Circuit Court Clerk Operation and Administrative Fund. Provides that of the remaining 10% of the amount deposited, the Circuit Court Clerk shall remit 70% to the sheriff for bail bond costs and 30% to the State’s Attorney for bail bond costs. Effective immediately.

Sen. Antonio Munoz is true to form. Barackenomics is coming to town. Impeach Congress will be keeping an eye on Obama’s good old pals from Illinois. Unrest Assured.

-Mastershake